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Since 2014 Pakistan has reported improvements in their security and their economy.  
The aim of this study is to determine if those improvements are a result of counterterrorism 
policies implemented that same year, along with aggressive military operations.  By utilizing 
a linear regression model, the hope was to identify a direct negative relationship between 
Pakistan’s Market Potential Index scores from 2007-2014 and their reported fiscal loss due to 
terrorism during the same years.  If a relationship exists between those two variables, then 
there is an opportunity to argue that Pakistan has improved their economic situation by 
reducing domestic terrorism within their borders.  Other research on this topic only measures 
Pakistan’s economic loss from acts of terrorism; there is no record of research gauging the 
effects of reported improvements.  By studying the effects of a reduction in terrorist acts on 
the economic potential of Pakistan, the goal is to support increased security reform in 
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent Improvement in Pakistan’s Economy and Security 
 In 2016 Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to increase from 4.2-
4.5% and will be led by services, small-scale manufacturing and construction.  In April of 
2016 China announced plans to build an economic corridor between Kashgar, in the People’s 
Republic of China, and the Pakistani port of Gwadar, which represents new opportunities for 
private investment and overall economic growth in South Asia (Asian Development Bank 
2015).  In the security sector Pakistan continues to face significant threats from the Tehrik-e-
Taliban (TTP), but drastic improvements have occurred since implementing new 
counterterrorism (CT) strategies in 2014.  For example, in November of 2015 a drone strike 
killed Khan Sayed, a senior member of the TTP who lead a breakaway faction of the group 
(Council on Foreign Relations 2016).  As of August of last year the Pakistani military 
claimed to have killed over 3000 militants in a military offensive that began in 2014 across 
North Waziristan (Masood 2015).  Progress in Pakistan is undeniable, but terrorist violence 
still plagues the Pakistani people.  So far in 2016 Pakistan has experienced a bomb attack on 
a bus that killed 15, a suicide bomber outside a court that took the lives of another 17, and a 
TTP attack that killed 9 Paramilitary personnel (Council on Foreign Relations 2016).  But for 
every setback new aggressive CT strategies and economic progress provide renewed hope for 
the future.                    
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Omand (2010) in his book Securing the State describes his impression of Ambroglio 
Lorenzetti’s great 14th century mural, the Allegory of Good and Bad Government.  In his 
description, he states that: 
Good government brings peace, stability and security, prosperity, and culture.  
Cheerful townspeople and country folk are shown in the spring and summer, working 
in harmony and going freely about their affairs transporting their goods on well-kept 
roads or sowing in the weed-free fields.  Builders are hard at work developing the 
city.  The watchtowers are well kept and manned.  Maidens dance in the street and the 
aristocracy, it may be seen, is shown blamelessly employed in the countryside in 
hunting and falconry whilst the business of city government is left to the hard-
working merchants.  Hovering overhead is Securitas, security, under whose wings all 
this is possible (Omand 2010).  
Omand is obviously inspired by Lorenzetti’s painting, perhaps as much by its beauty 
as the idea that security and prosperity can exist together.  The aim of this study is to provide 
support for that idea, that security and prosperity are symbiotic and interdependent.  The 
thesis is that a direct relationship exists between the growing economic status of Pakistan and 
their efforts to reduce the amount of terrorist activity in their country.  The null hypothesis is 
that no significant relationship exists between those two variables.  The time frame of 2007-
2014 was chosen to study that relationship with 2014 being the most eventful of those years 




OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS – THESIS PLAN 
The first chapter is an introduction to the topic and explains the beginnings of 
terrorism in Pakistan, which are the root of Pakistan’s security concerns.  Chapter two is the 
literature review on relevant literature covering the topic of security and prosperity in 
Pakistan.  Chapter three covers the research design and methodology, and both are described 
along with data supporting the theory.  Chapter four describes the results of the research.  
Chapter five is the conclusion of this thesis and all recommendations for future policy 
changes are presented.   
THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN 
Wahhabism, Domestic Terrorists, and the Pakistan-India Proxy War 
Pakistan’s political instability, civil unrest, corruption, and domestic terrorism have 
contributed to the economic struggle within the country since 1947, when they gained 
independence.  Of all those factors, it is the violent means of Islamic militants that operate in 
Pakistan which garner the most attention.  The possibility that Pakistan’s security and the 
growth of their economic potential are related calls for the idea be explored. How is a nation, 
ostensibly established for the purpose of religious tolerance, and as a safe-haven for 
Muslims, so torn by intolerance and sectarianism?  Are the economic highs and lows that 
Pakistan has endured since gaining independence a byproduct of political instability caused 





  A theory exists that the overarching influence for extremist views in all of South 
Asia stem from the Wahhabi government of Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi Arabian government 
enforces very strict Islamic laws within their borders, and charges anyone who speaks out 
against the government with apostasy.  The punishment for this crime ranges from floggings, 
to unfair prison sentences, or even death.  Saudi Arabia has also been accused of funding 
Sunni terrorist organizations through third party charities (Carpenter 2001).  Many of these 
groups train, live, and operate in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.   
 The beginnings of Saudi Arabian influence in South Asia can be traced back to the 
1970’s with the resurgence of Islamic religious schools known as madrassas.  Countries such 
as Iran and Pakistan utilized these religious schools to spread Islamist political ideals and 
provide alternatives to secular schools, which, prior to that point, didn’t exist in much of 
South Asia. In the 1980’s financial support for these Islamic schools started to come from 
Europe, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other states in the Persian Gulf (Blanchard 
2008).  These countries provided funding to various madrassas so they would serve as 
recruiting depots for anti-Soviet fighters known as the mujahedin.  During that time General 
Muhammad Zia ul-Haq , who overthrew the Pakistani government by force in 1977, used 
those funds to increase the number of madrassas from 900 to over 33,000, by the end of his 
reign in 1988 (Murphy 2014).  It is from this pool of students, who were taught in Islamic 
schools funded by the Western World and the Persian Gulf states, that the Taliban was born.  
The Taliban, literally meaning “student” in Arabic, were Islamic clerics and students 
groomed in Afghan madrassas and taught a form of Islam very similar to the Wahhabism 
practiced in Saudi Arabia (Blanchard 2008).  
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 The spread of terrorist organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan is not limited to 
Saudi Arabian Wahhabi influences or even Islamic extremism.  Groups with anti-Indian 
objectives such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, formerly known as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, and the 
Haqqani Network have been residing in Pakistan since they began.  Many of these 
organizations have been intentionally kept off of Pakistan’s list of organizations and have 
even received clemency when the Pakistani military conducted operations in the North 
Waziristan agency and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Laub 2013).  
Indeed, Pakistan has chosen to condemn certain terrorist groups while condoning others who 
support their anti-Indian agenda.  Because of Pakistan’s indiscretion, other terrorist factions 
have developed within their own borders that have only one purpose, to oust the Pakistani 
government. 
A Problem Pakistan Can’t Ignore 
Taliban sympathizers and allies existed throughout the Pakistan-Afghan borders 
before 2001, but were not networked in any way, and certainly did not identify themselves as 
“Taliban.”  Shortly after the American military campaign began in Afghanistan in 2001 many 
of these sympathizers began joining together.  While the Pakistani Army was conducting 
operations in search of foreigners linked to Al-Qaeda, these sympathizers began attacking 
military and government establishments in an attempt to draw the Pakistani government to 
the negotiating table.  They also attacked and killed over 200 tribal elders in the FATA, thus 
destroying the tribal Jirga institutions and giving themselves legitimate control by default in 
those regions (Abbas 2008).   
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 However, it wasn’t until December 2007 that these small militant groups officially 
fused together under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a wanted man from South 
Waziristan and known militant leader (Abbas 2008).  This organization went by the name of 
the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and since their inception they have voiced their objectives as 
follows: 
1. Enforce Shari’a, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform 
“defensive jihad against the Pakistan army.” 
2. React strongly if military operations are not stopped in the Swat District and 
North Waziristan Agency. 
3. Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area.   
4. Demand the release of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Imam Abdul Aziz. 
5. Refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan. 
(Abbas 2008) 
There is obviously no room for the Pakistani government to work with the TTP to 
establish a peaceful resolution.  Not only does the TTP stand in principle against the 
government, but they’ve also had an apparent impact on the government’s stability.  For 
example, they’ve been accused of alleged involvement in the assassination of Pakistan’s 
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007.  While a TTP spokesman 
denied the allegations, the government claims they have a transcript of a telephone 




The TTP in the FATA and Northern and Southern Waziristan are not the only threat 
to the Pakistani government by domestic insurgents.  The Balochistan Liberation Army 
(BLA), the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), and the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) are 
ethnonationalist militant organizations that strive for greater regional autonomy in the 
province of Balochistan.  Unlike the Taliban or Haqqani Network, these organizations are not 
concerned with religious ideals, and they place ethnicity over religious identity.  In 2009, a 
cease-fire was declared between all three groups and the Pakistani Army as negotiations for 
peace began.  When the BLA, BLF, and the BRA grew frustrated with Pakistan’s lack of 
effort, the alleged leader of the BLA, Brahamdagh Khan Bugti, made a public request during 
a televised interview for all Balochi people to kill any non-native Balochi living in 
Balochistan.  It is estimated that as many as 500 Punjabis were murdered immediately after 
the interview as a direct result of Bugti’s request (Stanford University 2013).  
Pakistan Intelligence Services claim that India provides arms, funding, and training 
for Balochistan militant groups in retaliation for the support Pakistan provides for anti-Indian 
terrorist organizations (Stanford University 2013).  Regardless of who is providing support 
for the BLA, BLF, and the BRA, they serve as examples of how Pakistan’s instability has 
allowed violent militant groups to gain power in their localities and suppress the 
government’s ability to provide economic support and protection for Pakistani citizens.  It is 
the effect of the instability created by these militants that serves as the point of study for this 





There are currently five categories of Islamist Militant groups operating in and around 
Pakistan that presumably affect Pakistan’s security and economy (Kronstadt 2013).  These 
five categories are: 
1. Globally oriented militants such as Al Qaeda.   
2. India and Kashmir oriented militants like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, 
the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jamiat ul-Ansar. These organizations are alleged to be 
receiving support from the Pakistani government.  
3. Afghanistan oriented militants including the Quetta Shura Taliban, or the Afghan 
Taliban, whose headquarters are rumored to be in Quetta, Baluchistan and 
Karachi.  The Haqqani Network, which is based in North Waziristan and Kurram 
also fall into this category. 
4. Sectarian militants who have anti-Shia agendas include groups such as the Sipah-
e-Sahaba Pakistan and its smaller branch, the Lashkar-e-Jhangyi whom is closely 
associated with Al Qaeda.  
5. Domestically oriented groups like the TTP who are largely composed of Pashtun 
militants who have anti-Pakistani government motives.   
(Kronstadt 2013) 
Not only do the terrorists in Pakistan have strength in numbers but in diversity as well.  
While some groups support each other’s efforts others do not.  Their agendas may be 
different but their impact on the Pakistani people is the same.  No matter the name, founding 




THE TURNAROUND POINT 
The Attack in Peshawar 
With such a long history of internal conflict, it’s easy to forget that Pakistan’s Army, 
and Police Force, have been working to build order and security for many years.  However, 
the momentum was never in their favor.  Then on December 16, 2014, a terrorist attack 
occurred that has since been called “Pakistan’s 9/11”.  Nine members of the TTP conducted 
an eight-hour assault on an Army public school in Peshawar that killed 145 people, 132 of 
them students.  A TTP spokesman said the attack was in retaliation for Army operations in 
the North Waziristan region that aimed to rid the TTP from that area.  That day, the actions 
of the TTP that day were so horrific they were even condemned by other militant 
organizations such as the Afghan Taliban (Walsh 2014).  This single event was a turning 
point for the Pakistani government in their dealings with militant groups.    
Utilizing terrorist groups to conduct a proxy war against India was dangerous 
business.  The TTP had proven to the Pakistani government that there could be no safe haven 
for any militant Islamic groups if Pakistan is to ever achieve peace for its people.  The 
Pakistani government pledged to rid Pakistan of all militant organizations, even those they 
had provided refuge for in the past.  The government met days after the attack and discussed 
their options and more importantly took ownership of their responsibilities.  Aggressive 
security policies, and the military operations that followed this event, not only improved 





 The 20-point National Action Plan 
  On December 25, 2014 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced his party’s response 
to the attack on the Army run school in Peshawar, the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) 
(International Crisis Group 271).  This new security policy promised to create avenues for 
Pakistan’s Military and criminal justice system to deny funding for terrorism, cease extremist 
propaganda and speeches, return thousands of Afghans back to their homes who fled to 
Pakistan during the U.S. invasion, and wipe out militant organizations throughout Pakistan 
without bias (International Crisis Group 271).  This aggressive approach followed two less 
assertive policies, the 64-point National Internal Security Policy (NISP), and the Protection 
of Pakistan Act (PPA), both signed into effect earlier in 2014 (International Crisis Group 
271).  The government promised this new policy would make gains where the others fell 
short.     
  A third CT policy in one year may have appeared redundant, but in conjunction with 
an effective military campaign, it signified a continuing unified effort by the Pakistani 
government to improve domestic security, protect its citizens, and its resources.  Also in 
2014, Pakistan’s annual report on fiscal loss due to terrorism revealed the most significant 
improvements in the categories of foreign investments and loss from “the cost of 
uncertainty” in over 5 years (Ministry of Finance, Pakistan 2014-2015).  Some of these 
improvements may have been assisted by renewed investor confidence after effective CT 
operations occurred throughout that year, along with the perception that Pakistan was taking 




  Many of the objectives stated in the 20-point NAP were recycled from previous 
attempts at instituting effective CT legislation.  The renewed vow to execute older failed 
policies, coupled with new aggressive strategies, is what made this new CT policy seem more 
relevant and hopeful than others.  The policies set forth by the 20-point NAP are listed 
below: 
1. An end to the moratorium on death penalties for all those convicted of terror 
related cases.   
2. The Formation of special trial courts led by military officers to include 
amendments in the Constitution creating paths that will allow terrorists to be tried 
in these special courts. 
3.  A ban on all armed or militant groups in the country, they will have no place and 
no permission to form a group of that nature. 
4. The activation of an anti-terrorism institution, National Counterterrorism 
Authority (NACTA) to end terrorism.   
5. Strict action against the culprits involved in spreading extremism, or sectarian and 
terrorist violence to include literature such as newspapers or magazines. 
6. Blocking all financial and media routes that are supporting terrorism 
7. Outlawed organizations would not be allowed to continue working, even under 
new names. 
8. The formation of a special anti-terrorism force in Pakistan 
9. Taking effective steps against religious persecution and protecting minorities 
10. Requiring all madrassas in Pakistan to register with the government and a review 
of all laws and regulations pertaining to madrassas will be made. 
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11. Ban on print and electronic media sources advertising terrorism 
12. Administrative and development reforms in FATA for the purpose of returning 
IDP’s back home 
13. The communication systems of banned terrorist outfits will be destroyed 
completely. 
14. Special security measures will be taken to seal the internet and social media 
sources that empower terrorism 
15. Terrorism will not be tolerated in the Punjab province. 
16. Karachi operations will continue until a satisfactory result has been achieved, 
antiterrorism solutions will be finalized to counter terrorism in any part of 
Pakistan especially in the Punjab province. 
17.  Special authorities given to the Balochistan government to endow political 
reconciliations in the province.   
18. Decisive action taken against terrorism 
19. Development of a comprehensive policy to deal with Afghan refugees beginning 
with the registration of all refugees. 
20. The provinces will be given special intelligence access to stop terrorism while 
special reformations will be made in the criminal justice system.  






Events leading up to the Attack in Peshawar 
 North Waziristan and the seven districts, or agencies, of the FATA have historically 
been an asylum for militants avoiding persecution by NATO or Pakistan.  The rugged terrain 
makes ground combat operations by large military forces difficult, and the tribal culture of 
the region provides a favorable environment for militants to blend in with locals.  Previous 
military campaigns by Pakistan’s Army focused on South Waziristan, where the terrain and 
environment were more hospitable.  Even when militants would flee to North Waziristan in 
response to military pressure, Pakistan’s Army refused to pursue them.  In 2009, the Chief of 
Army Staff, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, was urged by the international community to 
focus his efforts in North Waziristan where terrorists were fleeing from targeted operations.  
His response was “that Pakistan will undertake operations in North Waziristan when we want 
to… We will undertake such an operation when it is in our national interest militarily” (Zahid 
2015).  Later that same year, because of the Army’s haphazard counterinsurgency tactics, the 
TTP set their sights on capturing the Swat Valley, one of Pakistan’s most well-known tourist 
attractions (Rashid 2012).  
 Since 2006 the number of TTP members in the Swat Valley increase steadily and in 
2008, over the course of a year, the TTP destroyed over one hundred public buildings in the 
valley, many of which were schools for girls.  As a result of TTP occupation over 2 million 
people who resided in Swat Valley were forced to leave their homes.  In 2009, the provincial 
government signed a deal with the TTP that allowed them to impose sharia law in the courts 
of Swat.  Many Pakistanis saw this as a victory for the TTP, and within several days 
thousands of new members arrived and took over police stations, schools, and other public 
buildings, which was not a part of the agreement (Rashid 2012). 
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 As the influence of the TTP grew in Swat Valley, Americans became more concerned 
they might be capable of overthrowing the government and gaining access to Pakistan’s 
nuclear stockpile.  In April of 2009 the TTP began moving into districts outside of Swat 
Valley, thus spreading their influence.  Only then did Pakistan’s politicians finally began to 
address the issue they had been denying for so long.  In late April, Pakistan’s Parliament 
passed a resolution that endorsed military intervention, and on May 7 the Pakistani Army 
launched a massive air and ground offensive effort to take back Swat Valley.  30,000 troops 
moved into the valley while the UN and other aid agencies provided humanitarian care for 
those residents who were forced to evacuate to escape the violence (Rashid 2012).   
 By June most of the TTP had been pushed from the valley, although the more 
prominent leaders had escaped to the FATA districts and into Afghanistan.  In all, 300 
soldiers had died and 2,000 militants were killed.  Millions of people had been forced to 
leave their homes but were now free to return safely.  The security in Swat had improved, but 
the country, as a whole, was still beleaguered by violent militant groups (Rashid 2012). 
In January of 2014, the Pakistani government attempted to negotiate with several 
terrorist organizations of the FATA and North Waziristan.  During the negotiations, attacks 
by militants on government and civilian installations continued.  One very audacious attack 
on the Jinnah International Airport demanded a response by Pakistan’s officials.  A military 
offensive began on June 15, 2014 throughout the North Waziristan Agency and a region of 
the FATA close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.  30,000 – 60,000 soldiers were deployed 
to North Waziristan in support of the operation.  Their mission was to eliminate all terrorists 
who used that region as a safe haven without bias (Bodirsky 2015).   
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  This operation, known as Operation Zarb-e-Azb, meaning “strike of the sword of the 
Holy Prophet” (Javaid 2015), was the most aggressive military intervention Pakistan’s Army 
had conducted against militants to date.  The operation had four clear objectives. 
1. Degrade the terrorist network by reducing their numbers, integrity, organizational 
command, and infrastructure.  Destroy the umbrella of the TTP through their 
logistics, intelligence and financial systems. 
2. Remove their assets that protect them from drones and destroy all factories, caves, 
explosives, training sites, and hideouts.  Remove and detain all militant arms. 
3. Regain control of territory held by militants 
4. Coordinate efforts with the U.S. to utilize drone strikes on the most difficult 
targets. 
(Javaid 2015) 
 In October 2014, the military was clearing militant strongholds in the Khyber Agency 
when support for CT operations began to waver.  Then, the attack on the Peshawar Army-run 
School occurred and the TTP took credit for the assault (Zahid 2015).  This tragedy renewed 
Pakistan’s commitment and the operational tempo in North Waziristan sped up as terrorists 
were driven from Pakistan’s borders.  As of December of 2015, Pakistan’s Inter Services 
Public Relations division reported that 3400 terrorists had been killed, 837 terrorist hideouts 
destroyed, 21,193 arrests had been made, and 18,087 weapons, with 253 tons of explosives, 
were recovered during Operation Zarb-e-Azb (ISPR, Pakistan 2015) (Zahid 2015).  Perhaps 
what is most impressive about this operation is that 9,000 intelligence-based operations 
(IBO) were conducted indicating intelligence assets were being used effectively (Zahid 
2015). 
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 Operation Zarb-e-Azb in conjunction with the 20-point NAP was two of the most 
significant security measures implemented in the history of Pakistan.  In addition to the 
effectiveness of military operations, were revisions to the court system that allowed for more 
effective prosecutions of those accused of terrorism. The 20-pt NAP also deters and restricts 
speech or literature that spreads hate or condones violence.  Restricting the freedom of 
speech in Pakistan may seem repressive. However, in a country where lack of education and 
low literacy rates make many citizens easy to influence, it is necessary.  2014 was a pivotal 
year for Pakistan and the changes incurred since then are the primary inspiration for this 
study.  In the years preceding Operation Zarb-e-Azb and the 20-point NAP CT strategies 
were less aggressive and the Pakistani Army was noticeably less committed.  The years of 
data analyzed were selected to show how the more effective CT strategies of 2014 possibly 

















Practical Concerns Motivating This Study 
 The following literature review is a compilation of government reports and scholarly 
research which support the argument that a correlation exists between Pakistan’s economic 
recovery since 2014 and their current counterterrorism strategy.  This research furthers this 
theory by providing evidence of the relationship between security and prosperity in Pakistan 
from different perspectives.  For example, research by Estrada, Park, Kim, and Khan describe 
the cost of terrorism as extending beyond the direct loss.  They argue the cost of preventing 
attacks and recovery after an attack has an effect on the short-term and long-term economic 
growth in Pakistan (Estrada, et al. 2015).  It can be assumed, if their theory were true, a 
reduction in terrorist events would positively influence Pakistan’s economic growth.  
Unfortunately, many government agencies, such as Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
only report on actual fiscal loss after terrorist’s events occur.  This type of one-dimensional 
reporting only serves to garner support for financial aid from the international community; it 







 Since the U.S. invaded Afghanistan much of the dialogue between the U.S. and 
Pakistan has focused on Pakistan’s inability to secure their side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border.  Pakistan has made attempts to gain control of that region before 2014, but have not 
been able to sustain it at any rate.  The literature collected and analyzed for this study 
supports the need for aggressive action and provides evidence that any type of intervention 
may provide reprieve, even if only temporarily, from Pakistan’s economic hardship.  The 
following literature review is divided into two sections: significance of the problem and 
historical methods of research.  The objective of this review is to support the theory that 
Pakistan’s recent economic recovery may have been assisted by the aggressive CT strategies 
they implemented in 2014.  
Parameters of the Review 
 Research that is specific to Pakistan’s economic and terrorist issues has been 
reviewed along with research on the same issue as it pertains to the global market.  The 
relationship between security and prosperity is the point of contention and only literature that 
examines that relationship will be discussed.  Reviewing literature that relates the economic 
and security issues of Pakistan to similar situations across the globe provides further support 
for the theory that Pakistan’s increased security has possibly increased their prosperity.  The 
literature was screened from sources such as academic papers, government reports, 
professional journals, credible websites, and periodicals. The findings included from these 
sources serves as a representative sampling of existing information.  All accessible resources 
have been utilized to collect data for this research, but there does surely exist information on 
this topic that is not readily available to the public.   
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The Significance of the Problem 
As previously stated, the aim of this study is to provide an argument that the CT 
strategies of Pakistan since 2014 have played a role in their economic recovery.  Support for 
that argument stem from sources such as the Relationship Between FDI, Terrorism and 
Economic Growth in Pakistan: Pre and Post 9/11 Analysis by Shahzad, Zakaria, Rehmen, 
Ahmed, and Fida.  Their study explores the interdependency of terrorism on two 
macroeconomic variables, economic growth and foreign investment.  They conclude that 
terrorism does have a negative impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Pakistan after 
9/11.  Subsequently, a reduction in FDI impacts the economic growth of Pakistan negatively.  
Unfortunately, they do not provide policy recommendations for reducing terrorism in 
Pakistan, but their conclusions strengthen the argument that reducing terrorist acts will help 
stimulate FDI, which could increase economic growth and potential.  
 Another source, The Economic Impact of Terrorism: A New Model and its 
Application to Pakistan by Estrada, Park, Kim, and Khan, suggest that because the financial 
burden of terrorism can be so great, alternatives to combating terrorist in Pakistan should be 
discussed.  Utilizing a new evaluation model to assess the cost of combating terrorism vs. the 
actual economic insult produced by terrorist acts, they build the argument that the cost of 
preventing terrorism, or negotiating with terrorists, is more cost efficient than ineffective 
security strategies that allow terrorist to achieve their goals (Estrada, et al. 2015).  Peace talks 
with militant organizations such as the TTP and the Afghan Taliban may be spurred by this 
comparison.  In certain situations it may be smarter to negotiate with terrorists than combat 
them.   
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Hassan and Hashmi make statements that support this argument in their study called 
Terrorism and the Response of Investors at Capital Market: A Case of Pakistan by showing a 
possible correlation between significant terrorist attacks in Pakistan and drops in the Karachi 
Stock Exchange (KSE).  The capital market is often thought of as an indicator of economic 
growth, and a significant impact to the KSE could affect Pakistan’s short-term and long-term 
economic growth, thereby disrupting their economic potential (Hassan and Hashmi 2015).  
Eliminating terror attacks by any method may help reduce economic stagnation.  Even a 
temporary pause in domestic conflict could help spur economic recovery.  Hyder, Akram, 
and Padda come to a similar conclusion in their study Impact of Terrorism on Economic 
Development of Pakistan, and estimate that a “one percent increase in terrorist incidents 
[results] in reducing the per capita GDP growth by .39 percent” (Hyder, Akram and Padda 
2015).  
Pakistan estimates their total economic loss from terrorism, between 2001-2015, to be 
as much as 106.98 billion (Ministry of Finance, Pakistan 2014-2015).  That estimate doesn’t 
account for what they spend on increased security measures to prevent terrorist attacks, 
which Estrada, Park, Kim, and Khan account for in their model. Hyder, Akram, and Padda 
also estimate that the only economically limiting factor that is more significant for Pakistan 
than terrorism is their out of control population growth, which was at 199,085,847 in July of 
2015 (Central Inetelligence Agency 2016, Estrada, et al. 2015).  The research described 
above makes a persuasive argument that terrorism does affect Pakistan’s short and long-term 
economic stability, which one could assume based on this research, would improve if 
terrorist acts were reduced.   
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Historical Methods of Research  
 There are two traditional methods for measuring the economic instability caused by 
terrorism in Pakistan.  The first, is to account for the damage caused by terrorist acts such as 
damage to the infrastructure, payments to victims, or delays in importing or exporting.  The 
second method is to predict what damage has been done to Pakistan’s economic growth, or 
economic potential, from terrorism in conjunction with actual fiscal loss incurred.  This 
method appraises loss from terrorism based on reductions in investor confidence, impact on 
the stock exchange, and predicted damage to the gross domestic product (GDP). 
 Mamoon, Akhtar, and Hissam estimate that a single terrorist attack in Pakistan costs 
as much as $12 million dollars in exportation costs because of delays in exporting, investors 
refusing to travel to Pakistan, and the denial of visas to Pakistani business travelers 
(Mamoon, Akhtar and Hissam 2011).  Their study titled, Daily and Monthly Costs of 
Terrorism on Pakistani Imports, follows the first method of measurement by looking at the 
immediate and short-term cost of a terrorist attack.  This view does support the argument that 
a reduction in terrorist events in Pakistan might improve their economic potential but their 
study does not specifically discuss that topic.  They provide a great resource for measuring 
the impact terrorism has on Pakistan’s economy, but in no way make predictions for what 
Pakistan’s future may hold and make no recommendations for future security reform.  The 
point of my study is to use the information gathered from the research to predict what effect 
future CT reforms will have an Pakistan’s economy and recommend future security policies 




 Farooq and Kahn also measure the direct losses, in both financial and human capital, 
in Impact of Terrorism on Foreign Direct Investment and Key Indicators of Development in 
Pakistan.  They provide ample evidence of economic highs and lows after the American 
invasion of Afghanistan and peak years of terrorist attacks in Pakistan.  According to Farooq 
and Khan tourism has always been a major source of revenue in Pakistan, especially in Swat 
Valley, but domestic militant groups have discouraged travelers from visiting.  The impact 
terrorism has had on specific markets in Pakistan is not often discussed, and in 2002 tourism 
reached a low point.  Farooq and Khan point out that timeframe coincides with the American 
invasion of Afghanistan and an increase in terrorist acts in the region (Farooq and Zahoor 
2014).  Surely if security could be assured in Swat Valley, and other tourist destinations in 
Pakistan, then tourism would return along with its contribution to economic growth.    
In contrast, Crain and Crain follow a different research method in Terrorized 
Economies, which is closer to mine.  They predict what the gains will be for various 
countries across the world if terrorist incidents are reduced inside their borders.  Crain and 
Crain agree that the relationship between security and prosperity is quite real and in their 
words, “the potential gains to a country from reducing terrorism are quite large, although the 
specific estimates depend on a country’s population, base level of output, and investment” 
(Crain and Crain 2006).  While Pakistan is not the focus of Crain and Crain’s research, their 
findings are still very relevant to Pakistan; whose population is rapidly expanding and has a 




It is this type of research that validates large expenditures on security measures and 
ample amounts of time developing policies that eliminate militant organizations.  The CT 
strategies Pakistan implemented in 2014 provide a unique opportunity to study how increased 
security affects economic potential.  Previous research only speculates at what economic 
improvements might occur if Pakistan reduced domestic terrorism.  This research attempts to 
actually investigate that relationship, as it exists today.  




















RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
Explanation of theory 
      In theory, the relationship between a nation’s security and prosperity is directly 
correlated; increased security should result in increased prosperity.  In an attempt to validate 
that relationship data was collected, analyzed, and evaluated to determine if the evidence 
available could substantiate that claim.  Pakistan was chosen as the subject of study and the 
relationship between two variables, one representing security and the other prosperity, were 
examined to determine if that theory holds true for those specific variables.  The thesis 
statement is: there is a direct relationship between the Market Potential Index scores of 
Pakistan from 2007-2014 and the fiscal losses reported by the Pakistani government 
attributed to domestic terrorism during those same years.  The Null hypothesis is that no 
statistically significant relationship exists between the Pakistani MPI scores from 2007-2014 
and the losses reported by the government during that time frame.  2014 is the year that 
Pakistan implemented their most aggressive CT strategies.  Therefore, this is where the 
greatest changes occur in the data and is the focus of the analysis.  Presenting 6 years of 
preceding data for the variables gives more weight to the argument that the CT policy 





Relevance of This Study 
 After 9/11 Pakistan, because of their geographic location, quickly emerged as a 
pseudo ally of the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.  Unfortunately, beginning 
shortly after the invasion, Pakistan are believed to have provided refuge for terrorist 
organizations whose agenda matched that of Pakistan’s regional goals, regardless of their 
involvement in attacks against NATO forces (Laub 2013).  
 After years of corruption, possibly misleading their western allies, and an inability to 
provide security within their own borders, Pakistan’s economy has quite possibly stagnated 
as a result.  Pakistan’s position on CT strategies changed on December 16, 2014 when a 
militant Islamic organization known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) attacked an Army-run 
school in Peshawar (Walsh 2014).  This single horrific event forced the Pakistani government 
into action.  One week after the attack in Peshawar the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) 
announced the 20-point National Action Plan (20-pt NAP), Pakistan’s new CT strategy.  
Since the announcement of the 20-pt NAP Pakistan has seen renewed interest from 
foreign investors and restored security, to some extent, for its citizens.  The link between 
prosperity and security is seemingly obvious, undeniable, and inseparable.  Domestic 
terrorism costs Pakistan billions of dollars annually and possibly has direct and indirect 






The economic recovery and increased market potential of Pakistan may serve as a model 
for rebuilding and restructuring other war-torn nations who have been plagued by corrupt 
governments and terrorist occupations.  For example, as a result of renewed confidence in 
Pakistan, China has pledged $46 billion in financial assistance for developing trade routes 
and other various infrastructure projects that will shape Pakistan into China’s future trade 
corridor to the Arabian Sea (Shah and Page 2015).  The same economic potential lies in other 
countries such as Iraq and Nigeria.  With continued counterterrorism and intelligence 
community (IC) efforts, humanitarian aid, and assistance rebuilding and restructuring, they 
may also prove to be economically valuable to the United States and the rest of the world. 
Research Design 
 This study follows a descriptive quantitative research design that establishes a 
relationship between two variables.  The experiment does not prove causality, only 
correlation.  The research supporting the thesis only argues for causality, it does not prove it. 
Methods of Obtaining Data 
 The research collection for this study followed a historical design format.  All 
documentation has been collected from authentic and valid sources for the purpose of 
defending the thesis.  Since all the data utilized only presents established facts from the past, 
the act of research does not affect the results of the study.  Because historical documentation 
is subject to the bias of the author, and it is rare that any record of historical events covers all 
of the information needed for interpretation, there will be gaps in the research that must be 




EXPLANATION OF THE DATA 
Explanation of the Market Potential Index Score 
The Market Potential Index (MPI) is a subjective rating based on eight economic 
dimensions chosen to represent the market potential of a country. These dimensions are 
measured using different market indicators, then assigned a weight according to their 
significance.  Measurements and weights are then calculated to establish a total MPI score.  
Michigan State University’s Broad College of Business, also known as globalEDGE, 
designed the MPI to assist American investors who wish to expand their markets 
internationally.  There are 87 different countries that have been ranked according to their 
economic potential on a scale of 1 to 100.  (Broad College of Business 2014).  The 
dimensions and indicators used to calculate the MPI are listed in Table 3-1. 
Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance Overview of the Economy 
 The Pakistani Ministry of Finance (MoF) disseminates a yearly estimate of Pakistan’s 
annual economic losses resulting from domestic terrorist occupation and attacks.  This 
addendum to the yearly Overview of the Economy report provides a detailed account of fiscal 
losses by category and an estimation of total losses suffered.  For the purpose of this study, it 
also represents the effectiveness of each years CT strategies.  All relevant “ministries, 
departments, provincial governments, and autonomous bodies” are consulted to build an 
accurate annual estimate of financial loss in Pakistan resulting from terrorism.  The 
categories of financial loss used in this data include damage from both direct and indirect 
loss (Ministry of Finance, Pakistan 2014-2015).  Table 3-2 lists these categories and 
corresponding fiscal losses for 2010-2014 as per the Pakistani MoF.  
 
 28 
























Dimensions and Measures of Market Potential for 2014 
Dimension Weight Measures Used (indicators) 
Market Size 25/100 Electricity Consumption 
    Urban Population 
Market Intensity 15/100 GNI per Capita Estimates Using 
purchasing power parity 
  Private Consumption as a 
percentage of GDP 
Market Growth Rate 12.5/100 Average Annual Growth Rate of 
Primary Energy Use 




12.5/100 Consumer Expenditure 
Income Share of Middle-Class 
Commercial 
Infrastructure 10/100 Cellular Mobile Subscribers 
    Households with Internet Access 
    Main Telephone Lines 
    Number of PC's 
    Paved Road Density 
    Population per Retail Outlet 
    Percentage of Households with 
Color TV 
Market Receptivity 10/100 Per Capita Imports from US 
  Trade as a Percentage of GDP 
Economic Freedom 7.5/100 Economic Freedom Index 
    Political Freedom Index 
Country Risk 7.5/100 Business Risk Rating 
  Country Risk Rating 
  Political Risk Rating 
 
 
 Data used are those available for the most recent year 
 
Source: Broad College of Business. 2014. Market Potential Index (MPI) - 2014. May 1.  




Table 3-2 Summary of Losses Due to Terrorist Attacks in $US billions 
                                                             2010         2011        2012       2013      2014 
Exports   2.90 1.237 .730 .3231 0.73 
Compensation to those Affected .80 .02428 .0296 .0139 0.01 
Physical Infrastructure 1.72 1.266 .7669 .4374 0.5 
Foreign Investment 2.10 4.597 .210 3.260 0.09 
Privatization 1.10 .277 4.719 0 0 
Industrial Output 1.70 .33169 .3085 .1296 0.02 
Tax Collection 2.10 2.431 2.315 1.732 2 
Cost of Uncertainty 2.90 .12183 .0503 .0326 0.002 
Expenditure Overrun 1.60 .11196 .3246 .2079 0.062 
Others .90 1.39888 .5220 .5566 0.55 
Total Losses 17.82 11.797 9.968 6.693 4.53 
         
 
 
The relationship between dimensions of the MPI and categories of Pakistan’s 
reported fiscal loss from terrorist attacks from 2007-2014 is presented in Figure 3-3.  An 
economic indicator used to calculate total MPI scores represents almost every category of 
financial loss due to terrorism reported by the MoF.  Out of 8 total MPI dimensions 5 are 
directly impacted by a category of loss reported by Pakistan’s MoF.  Because every 
dimension of the MPI is comprised of multiple variables taken from various resources the 
impact of the categories of loss reported by the MoF is represented by a percentage.  That 
percentage is a reflection of how many variables are connected to a category of loss reported 
by the MoF in that dimension of the MPI.  The resources used to determine the MPI score 
were examined to assess which variables are interconnected to categories of loss reported by 
the MoF.    
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Pakistan. 2010-2011, 2013-2014, 2014-2015. Impact of 
War in Afghanistan and Ensuing Terrorism on Pakistan's Economy. Government 























Figure 3-3 Market Potential Index dimensions and related categories of economic loss due to   
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ANALYTICAL METHODS, LIMITATIONS, DELIMITATIONS 
Description of Analytical Methods 
Linear regression was selected as the analytical method used to explore the 
relationship between the estimated fiscal loss to Pakistan’s economy as a result of terrorism 
and the impact that fiscal loss had on Pakistan’s MPI scores from 2007-2014.  Linear 
regression “is a statistical method that allows us to summarize and study the relationship 
between two continuous (quantitative) variables” (Penn State, Eberly College of Science 
2016).  The predictor/independent variable was the total fiscal loss reported by the Pakistan 
MoF related to domestic terrorism between 2007-2014.  The response/dependent variable is 
the MPI scores of Pakistan during that same time frame.  After fitting a linear regression line 
to the data, the strength of that relationship was quantified by evaluating the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient.  It is the strength and trend of that relationship that may support the 
thesis statement and will hopefully allow the rejection of the null hypothesis.   
If the null hypothesis is not rejected then further research should be conducted to 
explore variables that were not considered and may have affected the outcome of the results.  
If it is rejected, then the results would reinforce the claim that Pakistan’s CT policies 
implemented in 2014 have helped generate their economic recovery.  In this study, if the 
thesis is correct, there may be sufficient evidence to warrant further investigation into the 
reasons Pakistan has been able to regain their economic potential and improve security 
simultaneously.  Any further research conducted may make use of different research methods 
other than what has been used to conduct this study.  A different method of research might 
provide another perspective on this topic, which has value not only to the government of 
Pakistan but also other governing bodies all over the world.   
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The Limitations of the Study 
The first limitation encountered in this study stems from the reliability of reports 
disseminated by Pakistan’s MoF.  Any report produced by a government agency is subject to 
political bias and internal agendas.  It should be noted that the Pakistani MoF has only 
reported financial loss from terrorism as a result of the war in Afghanistan.  Because Pakistan 
receives compensation in the form of financial aid from the United States as a result of the 
war in Afghanistan, it would be to their benefit to report greater amounts of financial loss 
than actually occurred.  With the above limitations noted, The Pakistani Ministry of Finance 
is still the most reliable source of reporting on this topic.  Future studies on this topic may 
note the same government bias.  It should also be noted that Pakistan’s MoF did not report 
the fiscal loss from terrorism by categories during the 2007-2009-time period, only by total 
loss.  For those years it was necessary to assume the categories of loss were the same as the 
years of 2010-2014.      
The second, most obvious, limitation in this study is that the correlation between the 
data does not mean causation as a result.  The data supporting the argument only indicates 
coinciding changes within a specified timeframe.  This limitation is relevant because 
Pakistan will serve as a better model for counterterrorism/intelligence community (CT/IC) 
strategies and economic recovery if support for the apparent relationship between increased 
security and economic recovery can be shown.  Pakistan’s security will most likely become 
more important to international investors as their economy grows.  As a result of this 
increased interest, a greater range of data on this topic from government and academic 
resources will hopefully be available in the future.     
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Delimitations of the Study 
 Other factors inhibiting the growth of the Pakistani economy were not considered in 
this study.  Population growth, changes in government, and regional or international politics, 
etc., are important for predicting changes in any economy, but were not considered unless 
they were relevant to the Pakistani internal annual reports.  The purpose of this study was to 
show evidence that a significant relationship exists between Pakistani CT strategies and their 
recent economic growth.  The only years of data utilized to study that relationship were from 
2007-2014. This time frame was chosen for this study because no MPI data exists on 

































Correlation between CT Policies/Operations, and Economic Recovery in 2014 
 The method chosen to determine the relationship between the two variables, 
Pakistan’s MPI scores from 2007-2014 and the amount of total economic loss each year as a 
result of terrorism as reported by the MoF, was Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient.  Results 
showed a weak negative correlation (r = -0.223332) providing evidence that a relationship 
between the variables exists but is not strong.  The relationship is negative because as the 
amount of fiscal loss due to terrorism reported by the MoF changes, it may affect Pakistan’s 
MPI scores inversely.  The hope for this study was to provide evidence of that inverse 
relationship.  The significance level (Alpha) was 0.05, meaning there was a 95% confidence 
rating this analysis would correctly reject the null hypothesis.  However the p-value was 
0.6302, which means there is a high probability that the results are statistically insignificant.  
As a result of this finding the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with confidence.  There is no 
conclusive evidence that a direct relationship exists between the two variables.  Table 4-1 
presents the scale used to determine the strength of the relationship. Table 4-2 lists the actual 






00-.19 – very weak 
.20-.39 – weak 
.40-.59 – moderate 
.60-.79 – strong 
.80-1.0 – very strong 
 
Figure 4-1 Scale used to determine the strength of the relationship between the variables   
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Reported Total Loss (in 
US billions) 4.67 6.94 9.18 13.56 23.77 11.98 9.97 6.63 
MPI Score 20 24 20 23 24 NDA 24 66 
 
Figure 4-2 Market Potential Index of Pakistan and estimated total fiscal loss from terrorism    
between 2007-2014. *NDA – No Data Available 
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Relevance of the Results 
 Unfortunately, the null hypothesis cannot be confidently rejected by this study.  The 
reduction in the number of terrorist acts in Pakistan since 2014 may have stimulated some 
level of economic growth, but the methods used were not able to validate that relationship.  
As more data becomes available, the effect of Pakistan’s CT reforms on their economy may 
become more visible and future studies utilizing the same methods and variables may have 
greater significance.  For instance, the team at globalEDGE recently released the 2015-2016 
market potential index scores for the countries they observe. Pakistan received a score of 60 
in 2015 and a 62 in 2016.  Those scores are slightly lower than the score they received in 
2014, 66, but still show continued confidence in Pakistan’s economic potential.  Especially 
since, before 2014, Pakistan never received a score above 24.  
Future studies on this topic may observe a more relevant and direct effect of the CT 
strategies implemented by Pakistan during 2014.  Because the MoF has not released data on 
their fiscal losses from terrorism during the 2015-2016 timeframe, the latest MPI data on 
Pakistan could not be utilized in the calculations for this study.  As Pakistan continues evolve 
their CT policies, and they become more effective, the variables analyzed will hopefully 
become more significant.  One day it may be possible to understand the total economic gains 
achieved through security reform in Pakistan over both short-term and long-term timetables.  
The methods used in this research can be easily applied to the MPI scores and records of 
economic loss of different countries where greater ranges of data are available.  The 
conclusions and recommendations of the next chapter have been made, despite the findings 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
As Americans have learned since 9/11, intelligence based operations are critical for 
effective CT operations which demand little to zero civilian casualties, preemptive strikes 
when possible, an assertive public relation’s campaign, and a subject matter expert level of 
understanding about the enemies’ tactics, motive, structure, and culture.  Cooperation 
between the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Afghanistan will most likely have the 
greatest effect on CT operations.  Militants may be able to escape capture indefinitely if they 
continue to evade by crossing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.  Cooperation between 
intelligence officers and local authorities is critical for piecing together information such as 
phone numbers, family backgrounds, or political connections (Byman 2008).  Pakistan must 
also continue with serious peace talks between themselves and India.  No intelligence 
agency, even the ISI, is able carry out the duties required to combat a domestic 
counterterrorism effort, and focus on the unstable relationship between their nuclear capable 
neighbors.  As Pakistan moves forward, after American troops leave Afghanistan, America is 
best suited to serve Pakistan as a friend, trade partner, and advisor.  The United States risks 
pushing away other countries that should be more actively involved in Pakistan’s economic 





INCREASING DOMESTIC SECURITY 
The Importance of Intelligence Based Operations in Counterterrorism 
 As Pakistan continues to further their commitment of ridding all militant 
organizations from inside their borders, they will have to change not only their stance on 
Islamic militant groups but adapt a counterterrorism strategy that their intelligence 
community, primarily the ISI, may have difficulty adjusting to.  Many members of the ISI, 
law enforcement, and the military have been accused of being sympathetic to certain terrorist 
organizations because they may share an ethnic or tribal background with militants.  It is 
rumored that the Pashtun Taliban received years of support from the ISI because many of 
their intelligence officers are also Pashtuns.  Hopefully as the international community 
embraces Pakistan’s efforts at democratization and economic stability, the ISI will see it is in 
their best interest to align themselves with the government and not Islamic militants.     
In a report prepared by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, counterterrorism 
Intelligence was said to be similar to battlefield intelligence in that law enforcement or 
military leaders must rely on accurate intelligence to “anticipate the battle, visualize and 
understand the full spectrum of the operational environment, and influence the outcome of 
operations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012).  Accurate and timely intelligence is just as important 
to CT operations as it is to conventional military operations.  It is the gathering and 
disseminating of intelligence that is different between the two.  CT operations require sharing 
that intelligence with local law enforcement and sometimes the general public.  Good CT 
strategies rely on the public to report terrorism related activities and everyone is responsible 
for gathering that information (Murphy 2014).  The ISI possesses inherent qualities, with 
regard to those two processes, that no other intelligence agency in Pakistan does.   
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A new intelligence strategy must begin in Pakistan with absolute disregard for 
previous relationship’s the government has held with militant organizations.  When the ISI, 
military, law enforcement, and governing political parties have finally drawn a definitive line 
between themselves and terrorists, a more fluid and cooperative intelligence strategy will 
have room to evolve.  The intelligence reforms undertaken by the United States since 9/11 
have greatly improved the way information passes from collectors on the street to analysts in 
the IC.  Much of that information is then disseminated back down to the police officers, 
military personnel, or case officers on the street (Eggers, Steinberg and Graham 2003). 
Integrating the ISI into a national counterterrorism strategy that includes public support will 
not be easy or quick.  As Pakistan continues to build international alliances and improve their 
economic standing, attitudes and agendas across the nation are sure to change. 
As Pakistan’s CT strategy continues to develop they will also make better use of 
electronic intelligence gathering resources and their ability to predict possible terrorist 
attacks via strategic intelligence.  However, strategic intelligence reports must often be 
investigated or corroborated with forms of tactical intelligence, including human intelligence 
(HUMINT), direct observation, or imagery intelligence.  Direct observation and HUMINT 
require well-trained intelligence officers who can “think on their feet and identify the 
simplest of cultural patterns and behavioral modifications of those who work, play, and live 
within their assigned patrol areas” (Hughbank 2010).  Intelligence based CT operations 
improve the effectiveness of CT strategies, and the accuracy of intelligence based operations 




The Inter-Services Intelligence Agency: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Resource 
 If Pakistan is to continue increasing security, reducing domestic terrorism, and 
reaping the benefits of both, they must make use of the intelligence resources they have 
available to spearhead their counterintelligence effort.  Perhaps their greatest asset is the 
inter-service intelligence agency (ISI).  The ISI has a questionable history in their dealings 
with militant groups such as the Afghan Mujahedeen.  However, because they have extensive 
experience training, working with, and funding these types of groups they are clearly 
qualified to lead the CT effort in Pakistan.  If Pakistan wants to continue increased security 
and economic gains, the government needs to prioritize their security assets and ensure their 
intelligence community is being utilized in a manner that fits their abilities.  
Despite the ISI’s history of questionable behavior, they are most certainly capable of 
playing a role in domestic counterterrorism similar to the FBI in America.  By matching   
aggressive counterterrorism strategies with continued intelligence reform, Pakistan may see 
substantial increases in domestic security the same way post 9/11 intelligence reforms made 
an apparent impact in America.  However, persuading the ISI to curtail their agenda and 
focus on Pakistan’s national security may be much easier said than done.  Unfortunately, 
since the founding of the ISI they have been repeatedly redirected to protect and advance 
individual political agendas instead of gathering intelligence necessary for national security.  
As a result, they have become a corrupt and overly autonomous organization that the 




In Sean Winchell’s article Pakistan’s ISI: The Invisible Government, he describes the 
ISI as the most influential political force in Pakistan with regards to the domestic and 
international agenda.  He explains the complicated history of the ISI, which began after 
Pakistan lost the first Indo-Pakistani War.  The Intelligence Bureau, the only Pakistani 
intelligence service at that time, performed so poorly the government demanded the creation 
of a new intelligence agency.  The ISI was developed from members of all three branches of 
service and trained by the CIA and the French intelligence service, the SDECE.  It was 
modeled after Iran’s intelligence agency, the SAVAK, and initially domestic intelligence 
collection was not its priority (Winchell 2003).  The original ISI mission was to collect and 
coordinate military and nonmilitary intelligence between the Army, Navy, and the Air Force 
with a focus on India.  Then in 1958 the Army Chief of Staff, General Ayub Khan, overthrew 
the government and tasked the ISI with collecting intelligence on his political rivals.  Khan 
also created a covert division of the ISI to assist Islamic militants in Northeast India and the 
Sikh Home Rule Movement in the 1960’s (Winchell 2003).   
Khan’s adjustment to the ISI’s mission statement would set precedence for its misuse 
for political gain and supporting militant groups whose agenda’s aligned with Pakistan’s 
regional goals that would continue for decades.  During the 1960’s the ISI focused mainly on 
domestic intelligence and counterintelligence, and it warned social organizations, such as 
student groups, trade organizations, unions, and even Islamic clerics not to become involved 
in the political arena.  Anyone who might have political influence in Pakistan was kept under 
tight surveillance (Winchell 2003).   
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General Khan expanded the ISI’s powers even further when he ordered the ISI to 
monitor East Pakistani politicians because he was suspicious of Bengali officers in the 
Intelligence Bureau’s Dakha Branch in East Pakistan (Winchell 2003).  This was the first 
time the ISI was tasked with spying on other intelligence agencies.  The increase of freedom 
and power Khan granted the ISI would be very difficult for future government officials to 
reign in.  During the 1946 election the ISI kept General Khan apprised of the political mood 
and monitored his opponents running for office.  Despite Khan’s efforts Fatima Jinnah won 
the election.  In 1965, the ISI assumed intelligence collection and analysis duties during the 
Indo-Pakistani War in Kashmir, but after years of collecting intelligence on politicians and 
civilians they had lost the ability to address the Army’s needs for timely military intelligence.  
Their military intelligence skills were so degraded they actually lost an entire division of 
Indian tanks (Winchell 2003).  Throughout the remainder of the 1960’s and the 1970’s the 
ISI worked with the CIA to provide aid and support to the Khalistan movement in Punjab and 
they collaborated to disrupt Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s support to the Soviet 
Union.  That program ended with Gandhi’s death in 1984 (Winchell 2003). 
From 1970 until 1971, East and West Pakistan fought a brutal civil war and the ISI 
assassinated several prominent Bengali politicians in an attempt to crush the Bengali 
resistance movement (Winchell 2003).  President Yahya Khan, the president at that time, 
authorized the assassinations and in turn set the ISI on a path that increased their autonomy 
and made them even more difficult to control.  West Pakistan lost the conflict after India 
intervened on behalf of East Pakistan, which led to the formation of Bangladesh, or the 
Bengali state (Winchell 2003).  As a result, Yahya Khan was forced to step down and 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was elected as President of Pakistan (Winchell 2003).   
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President Bhutto tried to control the ISI by appointing Lieutenant General Gulam 
Gilani Khan as the Director-General, one of his closest allies, and promoted Lieutenant 
General Zia ul-Haq to the position of Army Chief of Staff (Winchell 2003). In 1972 Bhutto 
faced a revolt by Baluchistani nationals and in response he increased the ISI’s power once 
again by ordering them to conduct domestic intelligence in that region (Winchell 2003).  On 
July 5, 1977 General Zia ul-Haq used the ISI, whom he had recognized as an invaluable 
asset, to seize power in a coup and on September 17, 1978 Zia declared himself President.   
Zia was an Islamic fundamentalist who believed the only way Pakistan could become 
a major regional power was to become an Islamic state and one of his first acts as president 
was an attempt to Islamize the Pakistani military (Winchell 2003).  As stated earlier, he is 
also largely responsible for the increase of radical Islamic madrassas throughout Pakistan that 
spawned militant organizations such as the Taliban, and with his emphasis on the 
fundamental Deobandi-Sunni tradition, the tension between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan 
erupted into violence throughout the 1980’s (Murphy 2014).  As stability in Pakistan 
decreased, Zia continued to use the ISI to collect intelligence on his political and religious 
rivals in an effort to retain power (Winchell 2003).   
In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear tests and Pakistan became obsessed with 
gaining nuclear weapons as well.  Bhutto had created a division of the ISI whose mission was 
to covertly procure nuclear materials and missile technology from China and North Korea.  .  
Proceeds from heroin and opium smuggling by the ISI were deferred to this division as a 
source of “off the books” funding (Winchell 2003).  
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Then in 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the CIA went to the ISI for 
help.  Through the ISI, the CIA smuggled $3 billion dollars of equipment to Afghan freedom 
fighters, or mujahedeen, many of whom were students of Saudi Arabian Wahhabi madrassas 
and would later form a group known as the Taliban (Winchell 2003).  During the course of 
the Afghan-Soviet War a relationship developed between the ISI and the Taliban that would 
haunt American’s years later.  However, it is that same relationship with Taliban militants, as 
well as militants from other organizations, which qualifies the ISI to lead South Asia’s war 
against terrorism.   
Between 1983 and 1997, the ISI trained approximately 83,000 Afghan fighters with 
American money (Winchell 2003).  The Afghan Mujahedeen would prove successful and 
push Russia from Afghanistan.  The ISI and the Taliban developed a relationship over the 
course of the Soviet occupation that proved advantageous for the ISI regionally, but 
disadvantageous internationally.  In 1996, after pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan and 
then subsequently fighting against other internal factions for two years, the Taliban gained 
control of approximately 95% of the country.  Since that time, the ISI has been accused of 
supporting both the Taliban and al-Qaeda (Winchell 2003). 
During that same time period the ISI was also assisting Kashmiri separatists in the 
Kashmir part of Pakistan, which is a region that is still heavily contested today.  Since India 
and Pakistan separated in 1947, Pakistan has wrestled with control of Muslim-dominated 
Jammu and Kashmir with India (Winchell 2003).  The ISI uses a myriad of Islamic militants 
living in Kashmir to resist India’s occupation in the region to include the Allah Tigers, 
Harkut ul-Ansar, Hizb-ub-Mujahideen, al-Umar Mujahideen, the Jamaat Hurriyat 
Conference, Hizb-ul-Islam, and the Muslim Mujahideen (Winchell 2003).   
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Director-General Hamid Gul was responsible for ISI’s campaign to drive India from 
the Kashmir.  In 1989, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the ISI began 
supporting Islamic separatist organizations such as the Jamaat E-Islami and used money from 
their Afghani drug smuggling operation to finance the ISI-backed terrorist incursions in 
Kashmir and Punjab (Winchell 2003).  The Indian military has stated that prior to 9/11 the 
ISI funded and supervised, in cooperation with the Harkat-ul-Ansar who is known for their 
ties with al-Qaeda, approximately thirty training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and 
Pakistan proper that turned out combat ready terrorists to support the resistance movement 
against India (Winchell 2003).   
According to Eamon Murphy in his book The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan, it 
was the struggle in Kashmir that set the stage for Wahhabi influence in Kashmir Valley 
which spurred an ethnic cleansing in that region and a mass exodus of religious minorities 
(Murphy 2014).  To add even more pressure on India, the ISI worked with the Bangladesh 
intelligence service and utilized Bangladeshi insurgents in India’s northeastern region of the 
province of Assam and are rumored to have paid militants from Bahrain, Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and several other Middle Eastern nations to attack Indian 
interests as well (Winchell 2003).  It was at this juncture in the ISI’s history, they became 
proficient in using militant groups to execute their proxy war against India on multiple fronts.  
Besides the obvious ethical concerns, what the ISI did in the 80’s and 90’s was altogether 
impressive, although unsettling.  By influencing and supporting small groups of terrorists the 
ISI was able to apply effective pressure to India, a country whose conventional military 
prowess clearly outmatched Pakistan.    
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It was in 1990 that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto ordered a committee to review the 
ISI’s activities.  This committee concluded the ISI “had the makings of a de facto 
government” (Winchell 2003) and Bhutto responded by attempting to remove some of their 
power and regain control.  She appointed Major General Shamsur Rahman Kallue to the post 
of Director-General of the ISI.  Unfortunately, the move upset the then-Army Chief of Staff 
General Aslam Beg who convinced the President to dismiss Bhutto from her office in August 
of 1990 (Winchell 2003)  
 During Bhutto’s second term as Prime Minister she once again tried to regulate ISI’s 
power by transferring the responsibility for clandestine operations inside Afghanistan to the 
Ministry of the Interior.  It is rumored, that the ISI had her only surviving brother murdered 
outside of his house in Karachi in 1996.  The ISI then began a smear campaign, accused 
Bhutto and her husband of the murder, and Bhutto was once again relieved of her duties in 
November of that year.  It’s worth noting, and obviously significant, that the ISI has been 
accused of poisoning Bhutto’s other brother at the French Riviera years earlier (Winchell 
2003).  
 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who served a second term from 1997-1999, also tried, 
in vain, to regain control of the ISI.  Sharif appointed Lieutenant General Ziauddin as 
Director-General of the ISI, even though the Army Chief of Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, 
had objected to his appointment.  Musharraf countered Sharif’s appointment by naming 
Lieutenant General Muhammad Aziz, the ISI’s Deputy Director-General, as Director-
General of Military Intelligence.  Then, to gain more control over the ISI itself, Musharraf 
placed the Joint Intelligence North (JIN), the ISI division responsible for conducting 
clandestine intelligence activities, under Aziz’s control (Winchell 2003).   
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In 1999, the Clinton administration met with Ziauddin in Washington D.C. where 
they discussed Musharraf’s loyalty to Sharif and extraditing bin Laden to the United States 
(Winchell 2003).  When he returned to Pakistan Ziauddin traveled to Afghanistan, at Sharif’s 
request, and asked Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar to stop supporting other Islamic 
fundamentalists.  Ziauddin also asked Omar to turn over bin Laden to the United States.  
Musharraf countered Sharif’s, and the United States agenda, and sent Aziz to Kandahar to 
inform Mullah Omar he should disregard everything Ziauddin had said, including America’s 
request to give up bin Laden (Winchell 2003). 
 The Pakistani military has always been difficult to control for the government and 
because the ISI is a military intelligence organization they are even further removed from the 
governments’ control.  Just prior to 9/11 the ISI reached new heights of interdependence and 
by supporting the Taliban against Sharif’s foreign policy they were hurting not only 
Pakistan’s regional interests but also their international image.  It seems that Pakistani 
Government officials, and the ISI, have always lacked the ability to perceive their actions as 
other nations do, especially foreign investors.  
 On October 19, 1999 General Musharraf overthrew Sharif, who had become more of 
a dictator than democratic leader.  Musharraf took control of the government proclaiming 
himself the Chief Executive (Winchell 2003).  Musharraf then dismissed ISI Director-
General Ziauddin, and replaced him with Lt.-General Ahmed Mahmud (Winchell 2003).  
Mahmud, like Musharraf, was an Islamic conservative whose political agenda aligned with 
Musharraf’s.   
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Then, on 11 September 2001, the relationship between the ISI, Afghanistan, and the 
United States changed forever.  General Mahmud was in Washington when the attacks 
occurred, and he immediately pledged Pakistan’s, and the ISI’s, support in their pursuit of 
those responsible (Winchell 2003).  The ISI had never intended to hand over bin Laden to the 
United States prior to 9/11.  As a matter of fact, on 11 August 2001 General Musharraf was 
actually quoted in an interview by a Russian newspaper as saying “the Taliban…controls 
about 95% of the territory [Afghanistan] and cannot be wished away… We feel that the 
international community should engage the Taliban rather than isolating them and ostracizing 
them” (Winchell 2003).  Despite Mahmud’s promises after 9/11, at least five ISI intelligence 
officers are believed to have assisted the Taliban in preparing their defenses against an 
imminent American attack (Winchell 2003). 
President Musharraf did support the American agenda in Afghanistan after 9/11.  He 
was clearly aware of the how 9/11 would change international relations and chose to support 
the Western world in dismantling al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  In October 2011 
Musharraf sent Mahmud to Kandahar to order Mullah Omar to hand bin Laden over to the 
United States.  Mahmud did exactly what Musharraf had done to Sharif.  He advised Mullah 
Omar to not hand over bin Laden.  Soon after, Musharraf learned of Mahmud’s betrayal 
attempted once again to bring the ISI under better authority and replaced Mahmud with 
Lieutenant-General Ehsan ul-Haq (Winchell 2003).  However, new leadership would not be 
enough to bring the ISI under control.   
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Following 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States came to rely 
heavily on intelligence provided by the ISI.  The ISI is believed to have possessed vast 
amounts of intelligence on bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban.  In exchange for American 
electronic intelligence and financial compensation, the ISI has provided the United States 
with access to their intelligence resources and assistance detaining al-Qaeda operatives as 
they cross into Pakistan.  Such notable captures by the ISI include al-Qaeda’s operations 
chief, Abu Zubaydah (Winchell 2003).  The same reasons the international community 
remains suspicious of the ISI are why they may be Pakistan’s greatest asset in their war 
against terrorism.  As Pakistan continues to grow economically, and builds on opportunities 
to cooperate with Afghanistan and India to repress militant organizations, the ISI will need to 
conform to the regional agenda or find themselves as outsiders in their own home.   
Continued Intelligence Reform and Cooperating with Afghanistan  
What’s been even more remarkable than the reported success of Operation Zarb-e-
Azb in 2014 is the cooperation between the Afghanistan National Directory of Security 
(NDS) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since that operation began.  Rumors 
have circulated since the birth of the TTP that their funding has come from Afghan and 
Indian intelligence agencies (Farooq 2014).  As a matter of fact, in October 2013 American 
Special Forces interrupted a meeting between several NDS agents and Latif Mehsud, who 
has lived in Afghanistan since 2010 and previously managed the TTP as the second in 
command (Farooq 2014).  Despite a long history of mistrust, it’s possible the threat of U.S. 
withdrawal from Afghanistan acted as an accelerant for cooperation between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.   
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A memorandum was signed in May of 2015 that would allow NDS and ISI to 
cooperate on CT operations and investigations, share intelligence, allow the ISI to help train 
and equip the NDS (Ramachandran 2015).  President Mamnoon Hussain of Pakistan and 
President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan had come to an unprecedented agreement to 
cooperate on the issue of terrorism.  Unfortunately, there are still people on both sides who 
oppose that cooperation (Ramachandran 2015).  In December of 2015, the head of NDS, 
Rahmatullah Nabil, quit his post because of Ghani’s decision to work with Pakistan (BBC 
News 2015).  There are many Afghans, such as the Tajiks and anti-Taliban Pashtuns who 
have taken the blunt of Taliban violence, that have voiced their disagreement with trusting 
the ISI (Ramachandran 2015).  While an air of uncertainty may remain between these two 
countries the collaboration between their intelligence communities could be the foundation of 
increased stability, as well as prosperity, for both sides.   
   Afghanistan and Pakistan have different motivations for working together on 
intelligence operations.  Pakistan hopes that Afghanistan will shut down TTP bases operating 
on their side of the border and would like to reduce India’s influence in Afghanistan.  
Pakistan still believes Afghanistan plays a fundamental role in their regional security by 
giving them “strategic depth” against India.  President Ghani hopes the ISI will assist 
Afghanistan by persuading the Taliban to the negotiating table hoping for peace after U.S. 
withdrawal (Ramachandran 2015).  If the intelligence communities of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan can continue to work together, the next few years may be a turning point for the war 




 As of February of 2016, the head of NDS Masoud Andarabi and the ISI Director 
General Lt. General Rizwan Akhtar were trying once again to engage in dialogue that would 
build mutual trust for the sharing of intelligence and cooperation on counterterrorism 
strategies.  Talks between the two intelligence agencies fell apart in 2015 because of 
accusations made by politicians on both sides.  Most recently, Pakistan presented evidence 
that Pakistani militants are using Afghan soil to attack Pakistan.  Specifically, Islamabad 
believes a recent terrorist attack on Bacha Khan University in the Northwestern town of 
Charsada was planned and executed from the eastern Afghan border region by the TTP (Gul 
2016).  The Afghans have continually denied that militants who are attacking Pakistan are 
using Afghanistan as a safe haven.   
Also in 2016, high-level members of the Afghan military traveled to the Pakistani 
Army headquarters to discuss managing their shared border and other mutual issues of 
national security (Gul 2016).  Since the ISI falls under the Pakistani Army, dialogue between 
military officials should help to influence the cooperation between the Afghan-Pakistan 
intelligence agencies.  That cooperation will undoubtedly continue to reduce acts of terrorism 
and improve the security of the region.  Hopefully, the ISI and NDS will find themselves 
working together more in the future which may foster an improvement in the relationship 
between both countries.  After years of mistrust, building confidence in each other will be 
difficult for Afghanistan and Pakistan.  However, it will also be critical for the security and 
stability of all South Asia.  If Pakistan has been able to increase their economic potential by 
reducing the ability of terrorists to strike within its borders, then surely Afghanistan could 
benefit in the same way by increasing their own domestic security.     
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Peace with India 
 If Pakistan can build ties with Afghanistan, then there may be hope for improving the 
relationship between India and Pakistan.  Pakistan’s security strategy has always focused on 
keeping India from gaining control of Jammu, Kashmir, Punjab, Gilgit, and Baltistan 
(Macdonald 2016).  Those regions have been heavily contested since the two countries 
became independent in 1947.  Since the 1980’s Pakistan has provided support to militants in 
an effort to wrestle control in those areas from India.  India is guilty of the same by 
supporting militant groups that share their regional goals.  Because Pakistan has put so much 
effort in fighting a proxy war with India and competing with them for nuclear arms they have 
not paid adequate attention to their own domestic security concerns.  However, with militants 
in the contested region attacking both sides, finding a resolution will be difficult.  Continued 
intelligence reform and aggressive CT strategies that reduce acts of terrorism would allow 
both Pakistani and Indian politicians to engage in positive dialogue instead of making 
accusations.  It might also be possible that a political relationship between the two countries 
might one day evolve into strong economic ties as well.   
 An attack against an Indian Air Force Base in Pathankot as recent as January 2016 
explains why there is so much heated dialogue between both nations.  Myra Macdonald 
explains the nature of the India-Pakistan conflict in a very insightful article entitled On India-
Pakistan: Hope for the Best, and Prepare for the Worst.  She claims the Indians believe the 
attack was ordered by the ISI, or was an independent initiative by militant groups who are 
allowed to operate openly on Pakistani territory.  The Pakistani military believes they must 
stand up to what they interpret as Indian hegemony and continue to assert their claim on 
Kashmir (Macdonald 2016).  
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 Since both countries began nuclear tests in 1998 there has been no sign of reducing 
tension between the two.  Pakistan has used their nuclear stockpile to deter Indian retaliation 
while they continue to support militants, through the ISI, who repeatedly attack Indian 
interests along their border (Macdonald 2016).  The autonomy of the ISI supposedly allows 
some of these attacks to occur without the approval of the Pakistani government.  Gaining 
control of the ISI is critical not only for peace between Afghanistan, the United States, and 
Pakistan, but with India as well.  Unfortunately, as stated before, Pakistan has a history of 
being overly concerned with achieving regional objectives, even if it severely damaged their 
international image.   
 The Kargil War of 1998-1999 is an example of the strategic blindness that Pakistan 
has long since suffered from which continues to impede the progress of Indian-Pakistani 
relations.  That winter Pakistan moved troops across the Line of Control (LOC), which 
divides Jammu and Kashmir, into mountain positions on the Indian side above the towns on 
Dras and Kargil (Macdonald 2016).  From Pakistan’s point of view the move was appropriate 
since India moved into several passes along the Siachen glacier in 1984, which lies in the 
high mountains just beyond the end of the LoC (Macdonald 2016).  Unfortunately, Pakistan’s 
timing could not have been worse since they had just concluded a round of nuclear tests.  Bad 
planning and poor timing made the Kargil operation look like and attempt to sabotage a 
peace initiative that had just been proposed by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 
(Macdonald 2016).  Once again, Pakistan had proven they were their own worst enemy and 
India retaliated with military action pushing Pakistan back to their side of the LoC.   
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The facilitation of jihadi groups in Kashmir would prove especially detrimental to 
Pakistan after 9/11 because militants from these same groups would later turn against the 
government who sponsored them (Murphy 2014).  So, why would any nation conduct such a 
brazen act in the midst of negotiations for a peace treaty?  Pakistan’s history of political 
instability and competing agendas between the Army and the government has always stood 
in the way of peace with India.  However, as both nations prepare to become key players in 
the international market, finding common ground is in both of their interests.  
 In May of 2014, Prime Minister Sharif, in an act of sincere diplomacy, attended the 
inauguration of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi where he promised to reignite the 
peace talks initiated with Vajpayee in Lahore in 1999.  Then, in July 2015, several gunmen 
attacked a police station in the Gurdaspur district of Indian Punjab and attempted to blow up 
a passenger train (Macdonald 2016). India believes the attackers were members of the ISI 
supported LeT.  Obviously, peace talks were railroaded once again, and then on Christmas 
Day 2015, Modi made a short stop in Lahore to meet Sharif.  Modi was the first Indian prime 
minister to visit Pakistan since Vajpayee.  Unfortunately, the plans were already in place for 
the 2016 attacks in Pathankot (Macdonald 2016). 
 Peace talks between India and Pakistan are an absolute necessity.  However, no 
progress will ever be made so long as Pakistan continues to provide covert support to 
militants who attack India, even if it happens discreetly.  At times, attempts at peace talks 
have been less effective than threats of retaliation in reducing violence between India and 
Pakistan.  While the international community condemned India’s use of force in Kashmir, it 




Many people in the international community are well aware of Pakistan’s economic 
potential and there is evidence, such as China’s recent investments, of renewed confidence in 
Pakistan’s economic stability over the last few years.  In February of 2016 the World Bank 
Group President Jim Yong Kim traveled to Pakistan to discuss the progress he believes 
Pakistan has made over the previous three years.  The World Bank Group have, by 
themselves, invested over $5.6 billion in Pakistan in lending projects, with $1.2 billion of that 
in 2015 alone (The World Bank 2016).  In President Kim’s words “Now is the moment for 
Pakistan to step up to a higher level of growth and opportunity for all its people” (The World 
Bank 2016).  The creation of new jobs, accelerating energy reforms, improving health and 
education at the community level, and more effective anti-poverty measures are all within 
Pakistan’s reach (The World Bank 2016).  But these reforms will continue to elude the 
Pakistani government if security is not a priority. 
 If security is needed for prosperity, the way Sir David Omand imagines in his book 
Securing the State, then Pakistan will most certainly have to continue driving terrorists from 
its borders, and make peace with its neighbors, to achieve its economic potential.  The aim of 
this study was to support an argument that security is necessary for prosperity and vice versa, 
in the way that Omand imagines it.  The hope is for the findings of this thesis to cultivate 
further discussion about the relevance of Pakistan’s security measures since 2014 and build 
momentum for continued policy development.  The results conclude that a weak negative 
relationship exists between the security and economic potential of Pakistan.  With data to 
support the argument, security and prosperity appear to be connected and Pakistan must 
continue driving forward with both in order to improve the quality of life for its citizens. 
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